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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the philosophy of 
John Dewey as a philosophical basis and apologetic for politi-
cal democracy, according to the traditional understanding of 
democracy in the United States. Since Mr. Dewey has evolved 
his own theory of democracy, it has been necessary to estab-
lish, first of all, the traditional concept before treating 
ot Mr. Dewey's social theory and its relations with that con-
cept. 
In the historical treatment of the notion of constitution-
al democracy, I avoided the more controversial issues regard-
ing the contract theory of government and the origin of au-
thority, and restricted the description to those notions most 
commonly accepted. 
With regard to the basic political philosophy of Instru-
mentalism, I have followed the theory which Mr. Dewey outlined 
in ~ Public ~ !!! Problems. I endeavored to fill in, where 
necessary, with fuller explanations or intelligence, experience, 
human nature, and values from Mr. Dewey's other works. 
Both in the ex~lanation of the basic political philosophy 
1 
2 
and in its application to democracy, it was necessary to dis-
tinguish between Mr. Dewey the social philosopher and Mr. 
Dewey the astute commentator on world history and current af-
fairs, for in the latter role much that he writes is merely a 
forceful expression otr common experience and common sense. 
But there are certain guiding principles, key ideas, and meth-
ods of approach that distinguish his treatment of social phil-
osophy. Consequently by singling out these characteristic 
ideas and methods, I have not followed in exact detail the 
argument of any one book. Another reason for this selection is. 
that Mr. Dewey devises his own terminology and sometimes re-
fers to the same problem or line of thought under a different 
heading, so for the sake of consistency I have chosen to use 
the same t~r.ms throughout. For the most part, I have endeavored 
to use Mr. Dewey's terminology throughout this thesis. 
Finally there is no effort here to make a moral eva:luation 
of Instrumentalism as a political philosophy, but merely to 
analyze it in ita relation to .American constitutional democracy. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NAME AND CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY 
Democracy is a much abused term. For generations it has 
been a shibboleth of political campaigns and has become so hack-
neyed and vague in popular usage thLt it no longer suffices to 
distinguish Gileadite from Ephramite. It has been the rallying 
cry of two world wars and through the peculiar exigencies of 
the second has become acceptable even to the •uthoritarians 
of the Stalinist school of practical politics. 
In America three divergent trends have recently been u-
nited under the common name of democracy: the systems of 
thought that have their root in some kind of progressive evo-
lution, post•Kantian philosophical scepticism, and the cult 
of modern science. The new democracy that incorporates these 
three streams of thought has been briefly spnthesiz.ed by Pro-
fessor Boyd Bode: 
The newer developments in both the natural 
sciences and the social order point to the 
conclusion that standards of value and con-
duct are flexible and changing products of 
everyday experience and are to be judged by 
no other test than the enrichment of human 
life here and now. This is the wider mean-
ing of the term democracy, a meaning which 
transforms it from a political concept i~to 
a whole way of life. This conception of 
values and conduct has never prevailed in 
the past. It cannot prevail now except at 
3 
4 
the price of extensive reconstruction in 
our beliefs and attitudes and inatitutions.l 
It would seem that the wider view of democracy which Pro-
fessor Bode proposes was contained radically in the principles 
of the particular philosophy of political democracy from which 
it was transformed. And though it is not the purpose of this 
work to analyze this new cultural-social concept, however, by 
an analysis of the political philosophy which underlies it as 
tested by its effect when applied to the traditional institu-
tions of American representative democracy, at least the basis 
of the liberty and freedom promised by this new order may be 
sounded. 
But before passing on to a study of the fact of political 
democracy as it has existed and been understood in the past, 
the place of the political philosophy of Instrumentalism in 
relation to the broader cultural concept may be made clear 
from Professor Eduard Lindeman's description of the back-
ground and aims of the men promoting the new democracy, for 
he wrote thus of the contributors to the first publication of 
The Conference On The Scientific Spirit And The Democratic 
Faith: 
They were, borrowing Emerson's famous phrase, 
•radical democrats" who believed in freedom. 
1 B.D. Bode, ~ !! Learn, Heath, Boston, 1940, 296. 
They believed that all genuine authority 
comes from within and is not external. 
Most of them, but by no means all, belonged 
to the American philosophic tradition of 
which William James and John Dewey may be 
said to have been the chief architects. 
With respect to science they could not be 
called positivists, certainly not in the 
Comtean sense, but they were persons be-
lieving in the dynamic power of science 
and truth. The majority of those who 
represented religious interests were of 
the humanist persuasion. The synthesis 
which they sought was one which combines 
science as a search for truth, democracy 
as the guarantee of liberty, humanism as 
the source of faith, and education as the 
instrument of progress. The truth they 
a·eek is neither apologetic nor externally 
authoritarian; the freedom which they af-
firm includes freedom to collaborate; and 
the education which they recommend consid• 
ers learning to be an everlasting adjust-
ment to changing circumstances.2 
5 
From an analysis of the philosophical basis of the political 
democracy the radical democrat professes and the type of lib-
erty this democracy guarantees, it is to be hoped one may 
gain a more penetrating insight into the whole of the creed. 
To try, then, to get at the meaning of the more limited 
topic of political democracy, at least as it is understood 
in America, John Dewey's procedure is a wise one, 
T·o discuss democratic government at large 
apart from its historical background is 
2 The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, King's Crown 
Press, New York, 1944,-xi. 
to mise its point and to throw away all 
means for an intelligent criticism of it ••• 
We limit the topic for discussion in such 
a w~y as to avoid the great bad, the mix-
ing of things which need to be kept dis-
tinct.3 
One of the earliest and most important treatises in the 
genesis of the modern democracy was Aristotle's Politics. In 
it he divided the constitutions or types of government that 
were known at that time into three divisions, all of them 
according to the number of those in control, whether one, a 
6 
few, or the many. If the rule was for the common good, the 
government was good. The good governments were (again ac-
cording to the number ruling) kingdom, ari. stocracy, and con-
stitution; the bad governments, where an interest other than the 
common good prevailed, were tyranny, aristocracy, and demo-
cracy.4 Hence according to this division, democracy was of 
its nature bad--democracy was distinguished from the consti-
tutional government by reason of the fact that in the for-
mer the poor ruled, in the latter a large military class. 
Aristotle's argument was that the majority would always be 
poor and the poor would always rule in their own interest as 
opposed to the interest of the oommunity. 5 
3 J. Dewey, !£! Public and !!! Problems, Holt, New York, 
1927, 83. 
4 Aristotle, ~Treatise On Government, trans. by W. Ellis, 
Dent, London 
5.For opposite view of. J. Ryan, The Commonweal, XL, 608. 
The discussion as to the best kind of government, as 
treated by Aristotle and the Scholastics was chiefly a ques-
tion of operational efficiency. The mixed regime, including 
monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements, advocated 
7 
by st. Thomas Aquinas and St. Robert Bellarmine, were the 
conclusion not so much of philosophical principles as of the 
political experience of their day.6 But the political think-
ers of the Middle Ages made a very definite and important con-
tribution to a philosophy of democracy in their explanation of 
the juridical genesis of civil society and government, for 
the doctrine which placed the origin of government in the free 
consent of the governed, so fully developed and defended by 
Suarez:. and Bellarmine, was the common teaching of the late 
Middle Ages.7 
However, the greatest contribution of Christianity to the 
development of democracy was the new concept of the value and 
dignity of the human person. It w as this doctrine of human 
dignity and natural rights that accounted for the steady pro~ 
gress toward a constitutional democracy through safeguards 
6 P.V.Kennedy, •The Principles of Democracy8 , Proceedi~s 
American Catholic Philosophical ~sooiation, Wasfiing~n 
D.c., !9~9, 17o. . 
7 A. Rahilly, 111Suarez. and Democracy", Studies, VII 1 13, 14. 
8 
established for the prerogatives of the individual and special 
groups. st. Thomas had observed that custom has greater au-
thority than the ruler since it represents the will of the 
whole people.8 W,ith an increasing number of charters .. -freely 
granted or extorted from monarchs by force--securing the rights 
and privileges of lords 1 barons, religious communities and 
cities 1 custom asgwmed the force of law and an opening wedge 
was entered for the growth of the constitutional democracy; 
for gradually the bourgeoise and the common man were able to 
claim as rightly theirs, what at ~irst had been secured only 
to a few. 
But there is an entirely new body of political theory 
that has had an important influence in the forming of con-
temporary notions of democracy and in many points it is at 
odds with the constitutional tradition of Western Europe. 
For Jean Jacques Rousseau proposed a philosophy of government 
which at once asserted freedom and was directly responsible 
for the growth of a revolutionary spirit and on the other hand 
provided theoretical basis for the complete disregard of the 
rights of minorities and individuals. 
According to the Rousseauvlan theory, the majority bas 
&bsolute and complete power over the whole of the body politic: 
8 T. A\qu.inas, Summa Theologioa,Marietti, Taurini, 1937, Tom.II, 
I·II, q.97, a.3, ad 2. 
As· nature gives each man absolute power 
over all his members, the social com-
pact g1 vas the body poll tic absQ.lute pow-
er over all its members also; and it .is 
this power which, under the direction of 
the general will, bears, aa I have said, 
the name of sovere1gnty.9 
Each man alienates, I admit, by the so-
cial compact, only such part of his pow-
ers, goods and liberty as it is impor• 
tant for the community to control; but 
it must also be granted that the sover- · 
eign is sole judge of what is important.lO 
The effects of this doctrine in practice were manifested in 
Paris during the dictatorship of the Directoire. The tradi-
tion has been maintained in democratic France in anti-cleri-
cal legislation and a state monopoly of schools. 
9 
But in America, the constitutional tradition, with roots 
in Scholastic philosophy, was a more important factor in the 
drafting of the Constitution of the United States and in the 
campaign which eventually sold it to the colonists than was 
Jacob1n spirit and theory. For the jealous defense of lo-
cal autonomy and the demand for a Bill of Rights was based 
on something more than narrow provincial suspicions. After 
all, the basic grievances set forth in the polemics of the 
Revolution--however accurate their application to the spe-
cific1nc1dents of the time--were that charter-rights or the 
9 J. J. Rousseau, The S!}c-ial Contract And Discourses, trans. by 
G.D.H. Cole, Ever-yman's Library, Den£; London, 1930, II,4, 27. 
10 Ibid., II, 4, 27. 
10 
unwritten natural rights of man had been violated. In spite 
of the religious intolerance of the times, there was an uni-
versal theoretical recognition of the rights of the indi• 
vidual and the struggles of the dissident non-established 
sects tended to strengthen the legal position of the minor-
ity group. 
In fact the emphasis of the Founding Fathers on a gov-
ernment of laws rather than of men was so pronounced that 
certain critics of democracy writing from entirely diver-
gent viewpoints concur in declaring that democracy as a name 
was odious and as a system of government was feared through-
out the first half century of American history. The avowed 
liberals, Charles and Mary Beard, describe the situation 
thus: 
For at no time, at no place, in solemn 
convention assembled, through no chosen 
agents, had the ~erican people offi-
cially proclaimed the United States to 
be a democracy. The Constitution did 
not contain the word or any word lending 
countenance to it, except possibly the 
mention of •we, the pJiople, • in the pre-
amble. Nor, indeed, did the Constitu-
tion even proclaim a republic. It did 
guarsn tee a republican form of govern-
ment in the states, but as John Adams 
wrote to Mercy Warren, during their 
heated controversy over political aims, 
nobody knew just what that meant. As • 
matter of fact, when the Constitution 
was framed no respectable person called 
himself or herself a democrat. The 
very word then had low connotations, 
though it was s:> me times mentioned with 
detachment; and the connotations be-
came distinctly horrible to Respectabil-· 
i ty a:f'ter the out· break of the reign of 
terror ln France.ll 
This suspicion of the name, democracy, continued, for 
as the historians Beard go on to relate, not until Jackson 
ran against John Quincy Adams was the term "Democrat" used 
11 
to denominate a candidate for President or a political party 
and at that Jackson was known as a •Democratic-Republican• to 
distinguish him from the other Republican, Adams. It was not 
until 1852 with Pierce that the Party of Jefferson and Jack-
s:on becAme known as Democrats. 
And the authoritarian, Francis Stuart Campbell, after 
quoting voluminously from prominent early Americans con• 
cludes: 
There is something pathetic in seeing 
Americans almost daily besmirching un-
consa:iously their ideals and their 
traditions--all thanks to a faulty edu-
cation. The Founding Fathers would 
turn in their graves if they could hear 
themselves called "'Democrats"; America. 
indeed was never a democracy, and never 
will be ••• unles.S. we make "democracy work" 
and rep~ce within the framework of 
a ~pure democracy", our legislation by 
the Gallup Poll. Those who have been 
taught the wrong interpretation may 
ask their money back from the schools 
where they have wasted their adolescence. 
11 C.A. and M.R. Beard, ~erica ~ Midpassage, Macmillan, 
New York, 1939, 922. 
And the textbooks which preach a spu-
~ious democracy may still provide us 
with fuel in cold days to come.l2 
Perhaps the main reason for the avoidance of the w·ord, 
democracy, in colonial literature was a more technical inter-
pretation of its meaning. The distinction is carefully drawn 
by Madison in ~Federalist: 
Under the confusion of names , it has 
been an easy task to transfer to a re-
public observations applicable to a 
democracy only; and among others, the 
observation that it can never be estab-
lished but among a small number of 
people, living within a small compass 
of territory. Such a fallacy may have 
been the less perceived, as most of the 
popular governments of antiquity were 
of the democratic species;- and even in 
modern Europe, to which we owe the great 
principle of representation, no example 
is seen of a government wholly popular, 
and founded at the same time wholly 
on that principle. If Europe has the 
merit of discovePing this great mechah• 
ical power in government, by the simple 
agency of shich the will of the largest 
political body may be concentred, and 
ita force directed to any object which 
the: public good requires, America can 
claim the merit of making the discovery 
the basis of unlimited and extensive 
republics. It is only to be lamented 
that any of her citizens should wish to 
deprive her of the additional merit of 
displaying its full efficacy in the es-
tablishment of the comprfhensive system 
no• under consideration. 3 
12 F.s. Campbell, The Menace of the Herd, Bruce, Milwaukee, 
1943, 8. - - - ~
13 J. Madison, The Federalist, Modern Library Edition, Ran-
dom House, New York, 80. 
12. 
13 
Since the question debated by the colonists was the erection 
of a representative government, the use of the word democratic, 
would only have confused the issue aa it was understood to 
mean government exercised directly by the citizens. When 
Madison uses. the word, popular, he includes that basic con-
cept of d~ooracy today, the idea of control and direction 
by the bulk of the people. It would also be a mistake to 
think that the importance and the place of the people in the 
immediate decision of policy and direction of government was 
not carefully considered, even theugh the term, degree of 
democracy, was not used to describe the object of the de-
liberations.l4 
The use of the term, democracy, however, to signify 
merely control and general direction by the people was not 
entirely unheard of in colonial times; for Alexander Ham-
ilton, the man generally considered to head the opposition to 
popular government and the Jacobin spirit, spoke of demo-
cracy in laudatory terms and clearly defined what he meant 
by the terms he used: 
That instability is inherent in the na-
ture of popular governments I think very 
disputable; unstable democracy is an epi-
14 For the important discussion on the role of a Representa-
tive and the discussion concerning instructed vs. unin-
structed delegates, of. Annals of Con~ress, First Con-
gress, Gales and Seaton, Washington, .c., 1834, 796. 
thet frequently in the mouths of politi-
cians; but I believe that from a strict 
wxamination of the matter--from the re-
cords of history, it will be found that 
the fluctuations of governments in which 
the popular principle has borne a consi• 
derable sway, have proceeded from its be-
ing compounded with other principles;--
and from its being made to operate in an 
improper channel. Compound governments 
though they may be harmonious in the be-
ginning will introduce distinct interests, 
and these interests will clash, throw the 
State into convulsions, and produce a 
change or dissolution. When the deliber-
ative or judicial powers are vested whol-
ly or partly in the collective body of the 
people, you must expect error, confusion, 
and instability. But a representative 
democra~,(Italics not in originai.)where 
the righ of election is well secured and 
regulated, and the exercise of the legis-
lative, exeeutive, and judiciary authori-
ties is vested ins elect persons, chosen 
really and not nominally by the people, 
will, in my opinion, be most likely to be 
happy, regular, and durable.l5 
14 
This channeling of the democratic principle which Hamilton des-
cribes through the separation of legislative, judicial and ex-
ecutive functions has, according to Fr. Wilfred Parsons, come 
t,o signify democracy for the contemporary American.l6 
15 A. Hamilton, Letter to Governor Morris, May 19, 1777, The 
Works of .&lexander Hamilton, ed. by H.C. Lodge, PutnamTS; 
New Yori, 1963, IX, 72. . 
16 •The fact of the matter is that there is not a single gov-
ernment in Europe today that is democratic in the sense 
that we Americans use the word. Probably the single char-
acteristic which to Americans, rightly or wrongly, speci-
fies our concept of democracy is the separation of the 
executive, legislative and judicial functions." W. Par-
sons, Vlh.ich Way Democracy, Macmillan, New York, 1939, 59. 
15 
F;rom the tradition of Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln, 
government of the people, the common man, the man in the 
street, John ~~ Public, and G.I. Joe have become part of the 
overtone of American democracy. Just as, for instance, stat& 
robes 1 complicated ceremonials and temporary titles are a 
part of the very real though diminutive democracy of San 
' 
Marino, so a careful avoidance of titles and a tendency to 
limit ceremony to simple, bare essentials has been part of the 
~erican tradition. It is this glorification of the common 
man and political non-recognition of social classes that is 
emphasized in recent comparie:tf)n of the Soviet and the Amer• 
ican •democracies." 
Before proceeding to devise a formula for the chief 
notes of American constitutional democracy, it might be well 
to recall by way of contrast certain other approaches and 
methods used in explaining democracy. There is, for instance, 
the point of view of Professor Bode and the members of the 
Conference on the Scientific Spirit and the Democratic Faith, 
an opinion previously cited1 which holds that democracy is 
something new on the face of the earth, that it is a way of 
life wherein standards of value and conduct are considered 
as flexible changing products of everyday life to be judged 
by no other standard than the enrichment of human life here 
and now. But even the proponents of the new democracy admit 
it is new and concede that the moral concept of the natural 
16 
law was the historical basis o£ democracy.!~ Whether or not 
the adherents of this new viewpoint have become numerous e-
nough to challenge seriously the statement that American demo-
cracy is still popularly considered to be based on the natural 
law, is irrelevant to the present discussion. It is enough 
to note that the constitutional tradition has been the basis 
of the system of gover~ent which exists today in the United 
States of America. 
By following an historical treatment, no mention ha8 been 
made of various theories that emphasize some one particu-
lar element as chiefly responsible for the development of 
political democracy. It is, for instance, the custom of 
those who £ollow the Rousseauvian tradition as the cldef 
contributing factor to democracy to analyze the threefold 
ra slogan: liberty, fraternity, equality. This approach usu-
ally leads to a cultural rather than a political discussion. 
Then there is the revival of the Augustinian concept of love 
~s the motive £orce of all human as sociation. M. Bergson 
made some rather startling assertions in this regard, which 
Jacques Maritain modifies and incorporates in his doctrine 
of the philosophy of person as the one true basis of demo• 
17 J. Dewey, Freedom and Culture, Putnam's, New York, 1939, 163. 
18 T.V. Smith, The Democratic Way of Life, Chicago Univ. Press, 
Chicago, 1926; Dewey, Character an~ents, II, 580. 
cracy. 19 
17 
Recently, too, Professor Perry has emphasiz.ed the 
role of Puritanism as an ideological root of American demo-
cracy.20 
As a conclusion to this treatment of the historical gene• 
sis of the name and concept of democracy in America, the fol-
lowing three notes may be said to be characteristic of that 
democracy today. First, there is that basic element of demo-
cracy referred to by Madison and Hamilton as the popular ele-
ment. This chief note has been well summarized by Charles 
Merriam: 
Democracy is a form of political asso-
ciation in which the general control 
and direction of the political policy 
of the commonwealth is habitually de• 
termined by the bulk of the community 
in accordance with appropriate under-
standings and procedures providing for 
popular participation and consent.21 
The second note has to do with what has been referred to 
as the Bill-of-Rights aspect of democracy. It concerns the 
recognition of the sanctity of the human person, the rights 
of the minority and the necessary dependence and harmony of 
19 J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, Macmillan, New 
York, 1940, 85. - · 
20 R.B. Perry, Puritanism!.!!!! Democracy, New York, 1944 
21 C.E. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism, McGraw-
Hill, New York:-I9~ 11. - --- ---
18 
the contract of government with the natural law. 
The third note, while not fundamental, is the idea usually 
contained in the adjective, democratic, that is a certain em• 
phasis on the political and social equality of all citizens 
whether or not they happen to be holding public office. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BASIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF INSTRUMENTALISM 
In studying any aspect of John Dewey's philosophy, it 
is well to bear in mind Dewey's own approach. His is not 
a philosophy of positive propositions, it is more a method of 
study and analysis of concrete situations and interactions. 
Hence one would not be justified in singling out a central 
thesis as the heart of Mr. Dewey's philosophy without having 
first proved that such is the case. It is Professor Dewey's 
continual theme that we cannot predict with certainty and 
it may be that experience will even dictate a change in the 
very method of study. 
It is true, however, that there is an implicit metaphys-
ics in Instrumentaliam, wherein •experience" takes the place 
of being. This experience, as it is interpreted by ~ohn Dew-
ey, is broader and.more comprehensive than the ordinary de-
finition attributed to the term by common usage. By exper-
ience, Dewey understands: nrcertain modes of interaction, 
of correlation, of natural objects among which the organism 
happens, so to say, to be one. tt,l But this over-all concept 
1 J. Dewey, •The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy", Creative 
Intelligence, Holt, New York, 1917, 37. 
ltJ 
of experience does not necessarily make Instrumentalism a 
monistic or holistic philosophy, for as William O'Meara 
points out: 
Thus considered, Instrumentalism is a 
variety of pluralism ••• as such it has 
been called tt.concatenism" which term 
is intended to mean a pluralism of en-
tities which do not exclude one another 
but are said to uoverlap! Dewey ap-
proves the word "overlap• when taken 
to refer to the fact that for genuine 
continuity of experience, an experience 
however unique in its own quality must 
be seen as containing~somethi~g that 
points to other experiences.• 
Such a basic concept necessarily implies a non-essen-
tialist approach to ~ocial or political problems; it ne-
cessarily rejects traditional concepts and de~ds a purely 
empirical analysis of individual concrete happenings as the 
basis of its tentative predictions. Thus to analyze a so-
cial concept or institution, Professor Dewey has recourse 
to an historical interpretation of the concrete instances 
which gave rise to the growth of that institution or idea. 
In a:n effort to analyze the traditional concept of 
human nature, he has recourse to the method of Plato's 
20 
" W. O'Meara, nJohn Dewey and Modern Thomism•, The Thomist, V, 
315. Confer also W. Savery, "The Significance-or Dewey*s 
Philosophy", ~ Philosophl of John ~ewe~, ed. by P.A. 
Schilpp, N.U.Press, Evanston, 1~ 88- , a:lso Ibid., 545. 
Republic 
I may seem to be going far a£ield if I 
refer to Plato's statement of the way 
by which to determine the constituents 
of human nature. The proper method he 
said was to look at the version of hu-
man nature written in large and legible 
letters in the organization of classes 
in society, before trying to make it 
out in the dim ·petty version found in 
individuals.3 • 
But he does not use the method as Plato did, that is as a 
~ purely analogical approach. For at best Plato hoped merely 
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to find some similarity between the justice he found on a 
large scale in the state and the justice he found in a 
smaller version in the'individual.4 Dewey, however, often 
bases his analysis of human beings and human nature directly 
on the study of society in the large, since there is only a 
gradual distinction between the components of experience 
of which the human organism is but one. 
Before proceeding to the direct analysis of political 
society, for a better understanding of the notion of human 
nature, Dewey begins by prescinding from given sources of what 
is; there is to be no discussion of causes, merely of acts 
and consequenCE:?& and he introduces the one positive and 
:3 J. Dewey, Freedom~ Culture, Putnam's, New York, 1939, 107. 
4 Plato, The Republic, ed. by B. Jowett and L. Campbell, Oxford, 
1894, 3W""a. 
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determining factor in all of his social theories, intelligence. 
We must in any case start from acts which 
are performed, not from hypothetical 
causes for those acts, and consider their 
consequences. We must also introduce in-
telligence, or the observation of conse-
quences as consequences, that is in con-
nection with the acts from which they pro-
ceed.5 
In other words, the purpose of this prelL~inary caution is to 
warn the reader against the tendency to attribute any consis-
tent pattern of acts which may be. observed in the individual 
or the group to some component of all human beings as a source 
of these acts. The notion of intelligence is introduced to 
preclude any dialectic necessitarianism. 
Professor Dewey points out that an awareness of human 
nature arose with efforts to control it, for ~en we are 
attempting to control anything we are acutely aware of what 
resists us.•6 He reasons that man became aware of some kind 
of force in human beings from the fact that they react dif• 
ferently from inanimate objects when an effort is made to 
control them and direct their actions. The argument continues 
that the distinction between good and bad in human nature cor-
responded to the pliability of that force. Insofar as the 
5 The Public and Its Problems, 13. 
6 J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Holt, New York, 1922, 1. 
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child or the s:erf yielded to the direction of parent or master, 
society called the native force or nature of the one yielding 
good. This pseudo-historical analysis of the origin of the 
concept of human nature, while a~hn following the method of 
~Republic, has definite Rousseauvian implications. The 
concoction of this theory was, of course, necessitated by 
Professor Dewey's denial of any definite end for man against 
which his nature and actions could be judged as means 
We are forced therefore to consider the 
nature and origin of that control of hu-
man nature with which morals has been 
occupied. And the fact which is forced 
upon us when we raise this ~uestion is 
the existence of classes. Control has 
been vested in an oligarchy. Indiffer-
ence to regulation has grown in the gap 
which separates the ruled from the ru-
lers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social 
censors have supplied aims, aims which 
w.ere foreign to those upon whom they 
were imposed, to the young, laymen, or-
dinary fold; a few have given and admin-
istered rule, and the mass have in a pas-
sable fashion and with reluctance obeyed. 
Everybody knows that good children are 
those who make as little trouble ~s pos-
sible for their elders, and since most 
of them cause a_good deal of annoyance 
they must be naughty by nature. Gener-
ally speaking, good people have been 
those who did what they were told to 
do, and lack of eager compliance is a 
sign of something wrong in their na-
ture.7 
But as to the nature of that force which men first dis-
7 Ibid., 2. 
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covered in their efforts to control it, Professor Dewey must 
again take an unusual stand by reason of his theory of ex-
perience. He denies that impulse and instinct are innate and 
primary and his explanation follows from the overlapping of 
the components of experience. You cannot speak of the pri-
mary and innate urges of a person, since the person and his 
environment overlap in the chain of experience and it is dif-
ficula as yet to determine whether this force we call in· 
atinct belongs to both the person and the environment or to 
either the person or environment alone. For instance, apeak-
ing of the dries of a new-born infant: 
It is an meaningless as a gust of wind 
on a mud puddle apart from a direction 
given it by the presence of other per-
sons, apart from the responses they make 
to it. It is a physical spasm, a blind 
dispersive burst of wasteful energy.8 
In answering the assertion that there are bas:tc instincts 
common to all men, that are evident realities and the compo-
nents of human nature, the Professor admits that sexual de-
sire and hunger are realities, but he co~pares them to the 
realities of suction, rusting of metals, thunder and light-
ning and remarks that: 
science and invention did not get on 
&s long as men indulged in the no-
tion of special forces to account 
8 Ibid., 90. 
for such phenomena ••• Advance in insight 
and control came only when the mind 
turned squarely around. After it had 
dawned upon inquirers that their alleged 
causal forces were only names which con-
densed into a duplicate form a variety 
of complex occurrences, they set about 
breaking up phenomena into minute de-
tail and searching for correlations ••• 
The psychology of behavior is only be-
ginning to undergo similar treatment.9 
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In general, from arguments like these, Dewey denies any 
of the distinctive notes that have been said to be proper to 
human nature. He further refuses to consider any initial prop-
erty of an object either as the cause of it's actions or of 
its effect on others and in this regard seems to deny the 
possibility of essential knowledge from induction. But it 
would be inaccurate to say that Professor Dewey denies the 
possibility of human nature, however limited that concept may 
in reality be. Rather it would seem his attitude is to dis-
credit what has been advan~ed as proper to human nature and to 
point to the social danger and intellectual inaccuracy in the 
traditional use of the term. 
It may be asked, since optimistic or pessimistic no-
tions of human nature are fundamental to any political philo-
sophy, whether Instrumentalism is in the tradition of Rous-
seauvian optimism. It would not be correct to reply with an 
9 Ibid., 149 
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unqualifi~d affirmative. It is true that in his interpreta-
tion of history Dewey tends to lay much of the blame for the 
evils of the world to outmoded institutions and conventions of 
civilization, but only as unfavorable partial conditions. He 
would not condemn civilization or any single institution of 
civilization as being in itself at all times a corrupting in-
fluence, for what might be an advantageous condition in one 
set of circumstances becomes detrimental with a change in 
those circumatances.lO 
Nor does Professor Dewey subscribe entirely to the op-
t~mistic point of view that human nature if released from 
hampering bonds will of itself, by an automatic self Esssr-
tion realize its own beat interests. 
Political and legal institutions may 
be altered even abolished; but the 
bulk of popular thought which has been 
shaped to their pattern persists. This 
is why glowing predictions of the im-
mediate coming of a, social millenium 
terminate so uniformly in disappoint-
ment, which gives point to the stand-
ing suspicion of the cynical conserva-
tive about radical changes ••• Where gene-
ral and enduring moral chamgea do ac-
company an external revolution it is 
because appropriate habits of thought 
have previously been insensibly matured.ll 
10 Cf. Dewey's analysis of the varying role of natural law 
concept in "Nature and Reason in Law", Character and Events, 
II, 790. ---
11 Human Nature and Conduct, 108. 
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Not only the Marxian concept of a single revolution that will 
. . 
bring about the milenniUJp, but even the Nineteenth Century 
concept of the continual march of evolution is repugnant to 
Instrumentalism: 
There is somethin§ pitifull~ juvenile 
in the idea that evolution , progress, 
means a definite sum of accomplish-
ment which will forever stay done and 
which by an exact wmount lessens the 
amount still to be done, disposing once 
and for all of just so many perplexities 
and advancing us just so far on our 
road to • final stable and unperplexed 
goal. Yet the typical nineteenth centurY, 
mid-Victorian conception of evolution 
was precisely a formulation of such con-
summate juveni11sm.l2 · 
The optimism of John Dewey rather approaches Kant's no-
tion of the struggle for holiness, a contest that goes on ad 
infinitum with new problema and obstacles continually pre~ 
aenting themselves, but the emphasis is on the present partial 
a.chievement that lends incentive and direction to future 
efforts. 
Positive attainment, actual enrichment 
of meaning and powers opens new vistas 
and sets new tasks, creates new.aims and 
stimulates new efforts. The facts are 
not such as to yield unthinking optimism 
and consolation, for they render it 1m .. 
possible to rest upon attained goods. 13 
12. ~., 285. 
13 ill!!• 1 288 
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The question of faith in the people as a political group will 
be treated at greater length further on. 
Before passing to Dewey's analysis,of society and the 
state, there is. one further element in his positive doctrine 
on human nature that needs elucidation. That element is the 
place of ~intelligence~ in human nature. It seems that the 
primary function of intelligence is to fore~•st what will be, 
if certain steps are taken; and in what is, to discriminate 
between good and bad, that is between what will be advanta-
geous in future actidms and what will not. •And I repeat while 
we hear much about intelligence, the effect of any theory that 
identifies intelligence with the given, instead of with foreM 
sight of bett·eir' and worse is a denial of the function of in ... 
telligence."J-4 By a denial of a. connection between intelli-
gence and the given, Dewey means that thoughts and percep-
tions are not accidents of the knower: 
Now dreams and hallucinations, errors 
pleasures, and pains, possible •secondary" 
qualities, do not occur save where 
there are organic centers of experience. 
They cluster about a subject. But to 
treat them a.s things which inhere ex-
clusi veJy in the subject; or as posing 
the problem of a distortion of the real 
object by a knower set over against the 
world, or as presenting facts to be ex-
plained primarily as cases of contem-
plative knowledge, is to testify that 
14 Character and Events, II, 797. 
one has still to learn the lesson of 
evolution in its application to the af-
faire in hand.l5 
Perhaps the Instrumentalist notion of intelligence might 
be conceived as & power of certain •organic centers of exper-
ience"'--up to the present it has been found only in human be-
ings--to make use of the present reaction so to affect the eu-
vironment as to direct its future effects and thus to a cer-
tain extent control future reactions. It is a kind of liv-
ing transformer with the faculty of seeing what is good for 
itself and operating accordingly. The notion is exteemely 
important in political theory, since it is the one factor 
that can change the course of events and upon which any con-
vept of progress and retrogression must depend. 
In • brief summary, Dewey's doctrine on human nature re-
lies on a method which rejects all argument from a common ef-
fect to a common cause. In an historical analysis of the con-
cept of human nature, he sees it as a vague unknown force 
which cannot be isolated in individual human beings or even 
in society as a whole, a force which man has become aware of 
through his efforts to control it. One sociological impli-
cation of his reasoning is that an oligarchy which sets the 
social aims and taboos has arisen through a concerted effort 
15 Creative Intelligence, 36. 
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to control that force. The~ only positive element of that force, 
thus far partially isolated and analyzed is intelligence and 
intelligence merely directs reactions to singula~ concrete sit-
uations. 
To proceed, then, to the study of political society as 
such, Dewey arrives at his conclusions from ~ study of acts 
and consequences: 
consequences are of two kinds, those 
which Affect the persons directly en-
gaged in the transaction, and those which 
affect others beyond those immediately 
concerned. In this distinction, we find 
the germ of the distinction between pub-
lic and private.l6 
It is from this distinction of private and public, that Dewey 
prefers to derive the notion of the state, rather than from 
the notion of society, ·for, as he points out, any act jointly 
performed by several may be termed social even though the di-
rect consequences are limited to those participating in the 
act. And a private act may be socially valuable by indirect 
consequences. In carrying out this distinction, Dewey de-
clares that the public is not to be identified with the so-
cially useful, and he mentions as examples of public activi-
ties which were not socially useful, unnecessary wars and 
unfair tariffs. 
16 The Public ~ !!! Problems, 12. 
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As a result of these distinctions, certain definitions 
are arrived at: 
"'Pri ve. tettr is defined in opposition to 
"'official", a private person being one 
deprived of public position. The public 
consists of all those who are affected 
by the indirect consequences of trans-
&ctions to s~ch an extent that it is 
deemed necessary to have those conse-
quences systematically cared for. Of-
ficials are those who look out for and 
take care of the interests thus affected.l7 
(Italics are not in original.) 
From these definitions Dewey erects his notion of a state, il-
lustrating its historical genesis with explanations of how 
a connnon interest bound all those who were adversely affected 
by the transactions of others, by feuds, robber bands, etc. 
The state proper consists of the measures and rules 
thought to be required by the common interest. for the sup ... 
pression of evil consequences which extend beyond the original 
participants of the act and of certain persons appointed to 
be guardians, executors and interpreters of these rules and 
me&sures. 18 Government is the over-all entity that includes 
both the public and the officials and is consequently a 
broader concept than that ot the state. To translate Dewey's 
terminology, one might say that government merely signifies 
17 ~-, 15. 
18 Ibid ... , 17. 
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all those who h~ppen to be members of a particular state in-
cluding the officials. The state is the organization of the 
people, its distinctive note is the existence of officials. 
Now, "The state represents an important although dis-
tinctive and restricted social interest. n,l9 This restriction 
of the state lies in the fact that it is concerned in general 
with those activities of individuals and "primary"; social 
groups which affect the security and prosperity of the pub-
lic. When the activities of these groups, however, a:re re ... 
stricted to their own members, they are usually outside the 
jurisdiction of the state. The primary groups are defined as 
the participants in joint action which has grown up out of 
biological conditions or local contiguity: they are families, 
churches, schools, labor unions, business concerns, etc. 
However, there is no hard and fast line of demarcation 
setting off the ex~ct extent of state influence, as may be 
seen from the following important qualification: 
Our hypothesis is neutral as to any 
general sweeping implications as to 
how far state a.cti vi ty may extend. 
~t times the consequences of conjoint 
behavior of some persons may be such that 
a large public interest is generated 
which can be fulfilled only by laying 
down conditions which involve a large 
measure of r~construction within that 
19 .QE• Cit. 28 
group. There is no more inherent sanc-
tity in a church, business corporation, 
or family institution than there is in 
the state. Their value is also to be 
measured by their consequences.20 
As to the infallibility of the state, Dewey holds no 
brief for the stand of Rousseau that the •xpression of the 
public's will is bound to be for the best interest of the pub-
lic; moreover the public will is not the guiding factor of 
the Instrumentalist state. On the contrary, he points out: 
•This conception of statehood does not imply any belief as to 
the propriety or reasonableness of any particular act, measure, 
or system. n.2l In accord, too, with the whole dynamic concept 
of Instrumentalism is the notion that a particular form of 
state or organization can cease to serve the common interests 
of the public. Or as Dewey puts it, a new public has come 
into existence, perhaps through some external agency like in-
dustrial change, and this new public must seek new means to 
protect itself by the regulation of the new forces which have 
been introduced into its environment. 22 Thus the central 
problem of politics is the search for the public, the effort 
to determine whose interests are being adversely affected 
20 Ibid. 73. 
21 Ibid. 2.9 
22 Ibid. 44, 45. 
and how tbay are being so affected. 
In commenting on the actual operation of states, Dewey 
remarks that power is poison. Oftentimes public officials 
are led to use their office to serve their own interests or 
through ignorance or overcaution use it in the interests of 
a particular class or group. &a a corrective, •0n1y through 
constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by 
citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and useful• 
nesa.•23 
The general reaction of the state on those concerned 
is summarized thus: 
It is ~uite true that most states, 
after they have been brought into 
being, react upon the primary group-
ings. When. a state is a good state, 
when the officers of the public gen-
uinely serve the public interests, this 
reflex effect is of great importance. 
It renders the desirable associations 
solider and more coherent; indirectly 
it clarifies their aims and purges 
their activities. It places a discount 
upon injurious groupings and renders 
their tenure of life precarious. In 
performing these services, it ·gives the 
individual members of valued associa-
tions greater liberty and security; it 
relieves them of hampering conditions 
which if they had to cope with person~ 
ally would absorb their energies in 
mere negative struggle against evils. 
It enables individual members to count 
23 Ibid. 69. 
with reasonable certaint1 upon what 
others will do, and thus facilitates 
mutuall'Y helpful cooperations. It 
creates respect for others and for 
one's self. A measure of the good-
ness of a state is the degree in which 
it relieves individuals from the waste 
of negative struggle and needle·ss con-
flict and confers upon him positive as-
surance and reinforcement in what he 
undertakes.24 
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Aln'Y description of the Instrumentalist sta.te which was 
restricted to a detailing of its positive features would be 
incomplete, tor an insight of the theor1 demands considera-
tion of some of the factors that were denied or rejected in 
its construction. Perhaps the most important of these is 
the question of the person or individual member of the state. 
What ia his place, What protection can he expect from the 
Instrumentalist statet 
Dewey clearly recognized the importance of the individual 
in non-Instrumentalist interpretations of the state: 
~o suppose that an a priori conception 
of the intrinsic nature ana limits of 
the individual on one side and the 
state on the other will 'Yield good 
results once for all is absurd. If 
however, the state has a definite na-
ture, ~s it should have if it were formed 
by fixed causal agencies, or if indi-
viduals have a nature fixed once for all 
apart from conditions of association, a 
final and wholesale partitioning of the 
24 Ibid. 71. 
realms of personal and state activity is 
the logical conclusion.25 
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But since to an Instrumentalist the person is just another fac-
tor in •experience• continually changing from his reaction 
with the things about him, he cannot be set up as a criterion 
of value. One cannot speak of definite, ~table rights of 
the person since the subject of those rights is himself so 
mutable. 
Something of the hypothetical nature of Dewey's notions 
of the person may be gathered from the following, taken from 
a recent book: 
The: idea that human nature is in-
herently and exclusively individual 
is itself a product or a cultural 
individualistic movement. The idea 
that mind and consciousness are in-
trinsically individual did not even 
occur to anyone tor much the greater 
part of human history ••• All we can 
safely say is that human nature like 
other forms of life tends to differ-
entiation and this moves in the direc-
tion or the distinctly individual, and 
that it also2~ends toward combination, association. 
At present, appeal to the individual 
is dulled by our inability to locate 
the individual with any assurance. 
While we are compelled to note that 
his freedom can be maintained only 
through the working to getber toward 
25 Ibid. 65. 
-
26 Freedom ~ .;.C..;.;u;;;;:l..;;.tur.;;;..-.e, 21. 
a single end of a large number of 
different and complex factors, we 
do not know how to coordinate them on 
the basis of voluntary purpose.27 
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The very existence of the problem of the individual and 
the social is denied; and the problem which really gave 
rise to the use of the generalizations, •individual• and 
"social• is explained thus: 
It indicates that ways of interaction 
between human nature and cultural con-
ditions are the first and fundamen-
tal thing to be examined, and that the 
problem is to ascertain the effects 
of interactions between different 
components of different human beings 
and different customs, rulea, tradi-
tions, institutions, the t&tngs called 
•social.•28 . 
Thus the obJect of investigation in this political problem 
is not the individua~ human being, but a component of that 
human being. The question of responsibility, rights and 
duties is consequently by-passed. 
Since, then, the individual human person and his rights 
are omitted as a guide in outlining the activities of the 
state, and since society and social bett•rment have been re-
Jected,29the search for the •public• and the protection of 
27 Ibid. 163. 
28 Ibid. 33 
29 Character and Events, 809. 
----
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its interests would seem to be the chief norm ot n.wey•s po-
litical philosophy. It must consequently be in the light ot 
that norm that we analyze Instrumentalism &s a philosophy ot 
democracy. 
CHAPTER IV 
INSTRUMENTALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY 
Throughout this chapter, unless specifically qualified, 
democracy will be understood in the sense outlined in the 
first chapter, that is an habitual determination of the gen-
eral control of the political policies. of the commonwealth 
by the bulk of the community through appropriate procedures 
for participation and consent. The application of Instru-
mentalism to the particular constitutional structure and 
practice of democracy as it has been understood in this 
country will be taken up in the following chapter. 
Thus, the concept of democracy against which Instrumen-
ta~ism is to be analyzed as a possible philosophic basis and 
apologetic is not exactly the democracy of which Mr. Dewey 
writes, evMl in the restricted political sense. For even 
Dewey's notion of political democracy is based on his theory 
' 
of the state: •·But one of the meanings is distinctly political, 
for it denotes a mode of government, a specified practice in 
selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials.•! 
Though not entirely different from the common idea of demo-
1 The Public and Its Problems, 82. 
-- !9 
cracy, the reference to officials in the special sense in 
which he has previously defined official, makes the notion 
dependent upon his adverse-consequence explanation of the 
state. 
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It is only fair to mention that Dewey, in claiming that 
the acceptance of his philosophy is necessary for the defense 
and growth of democ~acy, is usins democracy in the broad sense, 
in the sense of the Radical Democrats. However, Mr. Dewey does 
not deny that as a matter of fact there is a political form, 
where the people, for the protection of their natural rights, 
limit the functions of the various departments of government 
and control the policy of that government both directly and 
through the choice and approval of representatives.2 At 
most he would question the propriety ot calling that form 
democracy. He would pro~bly prefer to call it a •repre-
sentativeM government, in that it represents most closely 
the public interest.3 
To inquire, then, as to whether Mr. Dewey's concept of 
the state naturally requires for its perfection and fulfill-
ment the democratic form of government, we must have recourse 
again to his definition: •The state is the organization of 
2 Ibid. 86. 
-
3 Ibid. 76 
-
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the public effected through officials tor the protection ot 
the interests shared by its members.• He goes on shortly to 
add: 
our conception gives a criterion for 
determining how good a particular 
state is: namely the degree ot or-
ganization of the public which is 
attained, and the degree in which its 
officers are so constituted as to per-
form their function ot oaring tor pub-
lic interests. But there ia no a 
priori rule which can be laid down and 
iti!ch when it is followed a gooi state 
will be brought into existence. 
Oonce~ently according to Instrumentalism there are two pos-
itive criteria tor determining how good a state is: the de-
gree ot organization ot the public and the efficiency ot its 
otficera. There is also the negative statement that no con-
crete torm of government can, on philosophical grounds, be 
called a good state. 
£a to the first ot the positive criteria, organization, 
the sense in which Dewey accepts this term would seem to be 
the common one ot subordination for the achievement ot an 
end. In one ot his works he describes what organization in 
aooiety is: 
Conscious agreements aaong men must sup-
plement and in same degree supplant free-
dom ot action which is the gift of na-
ture. In order to arriv• at these agree-
4 Ibid. 33. 
-
menta, indi viduala have to make conces-
sions. They must consent to curtail-
ment of some natural liberties in or-
der that any of them may be rendered 
secure and enduring. 'rhey must, in 
short, enter into an organization 
(Italics not found in orlglnal) with 
other human beings so that the activi-
ties of others may be permanently counted 
upon to assure regularity or action and 
far-reaching scope of plans and courses 
of action. 5 
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In the same work he admits that organization tends to become 
rigid and to limit freedom.e 
This organization is perhaps the chief instrument of the 
•official• in the performance of his specific function, ward-
ing ott harmful consequences of certain types or joint action. 
For it would seem to be according to the Instrumentalist in-
terpretation, a function of intelligence in disposing envir-
oning conditions in suehwise that the resulting activity will 
be guided in a definite direction. Since the notion of com-
mand and the moral force of authority are specifically re-
jected in Instrumentalism, this indirect process of channel-
ing activity_through organization is ot paramount importance. 
In treating the extent ot the state's activities, we 
quoted Dewey as saying that at times the state might find it 
necessary to undertake within smaller social groups such as , 
5 Human Nature ~ Conduct, 307 
6 Ibid. 308 
-
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the church and the ~amily ma large measure of reconstruction." 
This large measure of reconstruction includes moral as well 
as purely physical means, for Dewey like Plato recognizes the 
importanca of education and cultttral climate in giving direc-
tion to the activities of a people. Hence there is no bound 
other than the supposed exigencies pf a particular a1tuat1on 
to limit the organ1~1ng activity of the state. 
Considering organization as an integral part of the In-
strumentalist theory of the state, it would seem at most to 
be indifferent to a democratic form of government. And since 
democratic governments have alwa7s beeh notorious for their 
cumbersome procedures by reason of overlapping agencies and 
~hecks and balances--from the days of the double consulship of 
Rome to the division of power in the Ameriean Constitution--
one would be led to conclude that with organization as the 
criterion o~ a good state, democracy would not rate very 
high. On the other hand organization is the very keynote or 
the totalitarian regime. 
The second criterion of a good state is the efficiency 
of its officers, •the degree in which its officers are so 
constituted as to perform their function of oaring for pub-
lie interests.• 
interpretations. 
This notion of efficiency is open to two 
In the larger sense it may mean the of-
flees of government are so constituted as to achieve a max-
44 
tmum of good for the people. including also in that ~ximum 
good the protection of the people against any abuse of of-
ficial power. In this sense the criterion would be a truism. 
But since there is no specific reference in the explanation of 
these criteria to a protection or the public from the of-
ficial. it may be presumed that the second and more common 
interpretation is intended, that is, that the officials have 
at their disposal sufficient power tor the attainment of the 
ends in hand. 
Nor from an historical point ot view would it seem that 
the criterion of getting things done and the ability to get 
them done quickly is by any means & special property of the 
democracy. It is even a common saying that the democracy 
sacrifices efficiency for the sake of freedom. The neces-
sit7 of recourse to the people. even granted well established 
procedures for the information of the electorate and the o-
pe~ation of elections or plebiscites, involves much more de-
tail and loss of time than would a spot decision on the part 
of an official of some authoritarian regime. 
The negative statement that Instrumentalism could give 
no real ~ friori rule for the formation of a good state is 
based on something fundamental in the Instrumentalist phil-
osophy. The reason no definite rule can be given is that 
there is no definite end against which the various forms of 
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of government can be measured as means. 
~he state as an ab~olute end is out. Mr. Dewey is very 
definitely opposed to the Hegelian notion of setting up the 
state as a supreme goal or absolute entity. He sees it at 
most as a social agency with a special work to do. It must 
prevent the evil consequences of joint action. But what is 
the basis of determining the evil or goodf 
I do not admit anything but a strictly 
relative distinction between·means and 
ends. Consequently when I have touched 
upon economic and political problems 
in writing upon social philosophy I 
have held that all such problems are 
problems of valuation in the moral 
sense. It is in this context that I 
have dwelt upon inti!lifent action as 
the sole and supreme me hoa of dealing 
with economic and political issues.7 
~is intelligent action in social matters is a kind of in-
ternal automatic process of setting up a temporary end. A 
problem presents itself; the unity of the mind is disturbed; 
various solutions are tentatively considered on the basis of 
past experience; finally, with the consideration of one so-
lution, the unity and peace are restored •. This solution then 
manifests itself in overt physical action. The latest'solu-
tion is merely the projection of a temporary end or aim,a 
7 "Experfenoe, Knowledge, and Value", !.!!.! Philosophy _2!: ~ 
Dewey, 591. 
8 ffiunan Nature and Conduct, 180-182, 190-194; of. also •Deweyra 
Ethical TheorjY; The Phllosophz of John Dewey, 314-317. 
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whioh will suffice until another problem arises. 
In summary, then, Dewey's basic philosophy of the state 
fails to provide a convincing apologetic for political demo-
cracy. The criterion of organization tends rather to favor 
authoritarian forms where popular interference is reduced to 
a minimum, as does the second criterion of efficient· officers. 
Moreover, the very basis of this philosophy of the state pre-
cludes the possibility of its being an apologetic for any 
definite political form. 
In his analysis of the development of democracy, Mr. 
Dewey admits as much: 
The forms to which we are accustomed 
in democratic governments represent the 
cumulative effect of a multitude of 
events, unpremeditated as far as polit-
ical effects were concerned and having 
unpredictable consequences. There is 
no sanctity in universal suffrage, fre-
quent elections, majority rule, congres-
sional and cabinet·government. These 
things are devices evolved in the direc-
tion in which the current was moving.9 
However, in another phase of Dewey's social philosophy, 
in his analysis of the notion of progress, we find something 
of an apologetic for political democracy. First of all, he 
states that the problem of progress is a problem of discov-
9 The Public ~ Its Problems, 144. 
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ering the needs and capacities of collective human nature as 
at present aggregated in nations and races, and in inventing 
social machinery that will aid in the satisfaction of those 
needs and liberation of the powers. The two chief obstacles 
to progress 1 according to the theory, are the conservative 
and the evolutionist outlook. The former tends to look on 
conventions and institutions as permanent and necessary, thus 
checking salutary change 1 and the latter feels that the pro-
cess of change ia automatic and fails to take the necessary 
steps himself. 
The aspect of this theory distinctly favorable to polit• 
ical democracy is the statement, •ease of social change is 
a condition of progress.•lO Since the more democratic a 
government is, the more plastic is its social structure, 
democracy would seem to be the political form best satisfy-
ing this condition of progress. But the second condition, the 
intelligent direction of the social chenge would seem to be 
another neutral or at least disputed factor with regard to 
democracy. 
The concept of progress was given a slightly different 
turn in Dewey 1 s later works. The article referred to above 
appeared in the International Journal .2!, Ethics of April, 
10 Character and Events, 822-827 
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1916. In the most complete expression of his political phil-
osophy1 ~Public~ f!! Problems, 19271 the idea appeared 
under the heading of •The Search for the Great Community.• The 
notion of the great community is the fulfillment of his idea 
ot progress, a satisfaction of the needs of the public and a 
fulfillment of its capacities, but it is a dynamic equili-
brium rather than a static situation and at that an equili-
brium never to be attained. 11 He described it thus: 
Wherever there is conjoint activity 
whose consequences are appreciated as 
good by all the singular persons who 
take part in it, and where the real-
iz:a.tion of the good is such as to ef-
fect an energetic desire and eff'ort 
to sustain it in being just because 
it is a good shared by all1 there is in so far a community.l2 
In anaJ.y•ing the historical events which have thus far 
brought men to a closer realization of this ideal, Dewey 
mentions that political democracy1 in itself fostered by a 
chance convergence of enonomic and social forces, has been 
perhaps the chief determining factor; but it is to be noted1 
he insists it is the desires and aims consequent upon the 
practice of democracy rather than the form itself which are 
of importance: 
11 ~ Public ~ its Problems, 148. 
12 Ibid. 149. 
That government exists to serve its 
community, and that this purpose cannot 
be achieved unless the community shares 
in selecting its governors and determin-
ing their policies, are a deposit of 
fact left, as far as we can see, perma-
nentlz in tne wake-of-aoctrines and 
forms, however transitory the latter.l3 
(Italics are not found in or1gl~a1.) 
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Atter showing how the fruition of this tendency on the part 
of the members of the community to look out for their inter-
est as a. community will lead to an exchange of ideas and en-
richment of life as the circle of groups and individuals 
affected by this beneficent influence widens, he concludes 
that •the great community", never quite to be attained, con-
stitutes a broad notion of democracy. 
Certainly, here we find an instance of that central em-
phases in Instrumentalism, the enrichment of life from the 
realization of the present experience with more extensive 
realization resulting from wider and more diversified con-
tacts with environment. .In the spirit underlying this idea 
we have what would appear to be a very definite impetus to-
ward democracy~ But unless the life to be enriched is that 
of the individual human person and unless certain bounds are 
set to what adverse circumstances living individuals here 
and now are to be subjected in the name of attaining that 
greater enrichment either for contemporary humanity or some 
13 Ibid. 146. 
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generations to come, that spirit might well find its reali-
zation in some totalitarian form which advocates rather re• 
pressive temporary methods for the eventual attainment of 
a free society. 
It is interesting, too, to note that. Mr. Dewey is not 
averse to the use of force in this respect. He refers to 
social and political &s well aa physical agencies when he 
states that power or energy is either a neutral or eulogis-
tic term granted an end that is worth while. And in the 
use of power constraint may be necessary: 
Constraint or coercion, in other words 
is an incident of a situation under cer-
tain conditions--namely, where the means 
for the realization are not naturally 
at hand, so that energy has to be spent 
in order to make some power into a 
means for the end in hand.l4 
Mr. Dewey, is careful to point out in his analysis 
that the trend to democratic method was not the result of 
political idealism and according to his own tenets, he can 
only surmise that it seems to have left certain •permanent• 
convictions amongst men ss to general policy in government. 
Another very important topic in Mr. Dewey's social 
writings is the question of science. He explains that his 
--·-------
14 Character ~ Events, 784. 
very philosophy of Instrumentalism owes its origin to the 
advance of physical science. The chief contention of all 
51 
Mr. Dewey's philosophical writings, logical, epistemological, 
psychological and ethical, is' that physical science by its 
new method has advanced far ahead of the institutions of so-
ciety and men's ways of thinking. His role was to introduce 
the new philosophy of method. 
One of the important notions derived from the notion of 
science is that invention is personal, it is the work of an 
individual intelligence rather than of the community. The 
innovation or discovery comes from the individual. Only after 
it has become habitual does the state or the organized group 
take it over.l5 The democratic inference of this notion might 
be that unless there is freedom of movement on the part of the 
individual and the power to initiate changes and reforms, the 
organization of society would remain stagnant. 
But apart fro.m the actual invention or new power thus 
put at the disposal of society is the question of the direc-
tion in which that new power is to be used. Mr. Dewey points 
out that in contemporary society it would seem the group in 
control of industry determine the direction of theapplication 
of science. More than that, from the act-consequence theory, 
15 The Public and Its Proble~, 58-61. 
- ------
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they provide a stimulus and thus indirectly select the field 
in which future inventions will take place. A very forceful 
example in recent times of the control and impetus given to 
technologi'cal advance by the Nazi regime, bears out Mr. Dew-
eyre statement that mere innovation or change, independent of 
the intelligence applying it, will not of itself mean advance 
toward the great community or the democratic ideal. A stim-
ulus may be provided for individual initiative along certain 
channels considered desirable by even an authoritarian re-
gime. 
As to the parallel of method, in the social and physical 
sciences, Mr. Dewey is wil'ling to admit that on the basis of 
what has already been accomplished the outlook ia not very 
bright. -.nat purports to be experiment in the social field 
is very different from experiment in natural science; it is 
rather a process of trial and error with some degree of hope 
and a great deal of talk.•l6 
But even granted a considerable advance in the science 
of human nature, Mr. Dewey still points to the ominous pos-
sibility that the advance in knowledge might merely be the 
means of putting more effective instruments into the hands 
of those who desire to manipulate other human beings for their 
16 Freedom ~Culture, 65. 
for their own advantage.l7 53 In this sense the newly acquired 
knowledge would merely be a neutral power of the environment 
available for whatever aim an intelligence here and now choses 
to make of it. 
But in spite of the rather insignificant advance thus far, 
and the neutral character of social knowledge in itself, Mr. 
Dewey sees important consequences for the future of democracy 
in a growth of popular faith with regard to the effectiveness 
of the scientific method in social affairs. It would perhaps 
be more accurate to say that rather than any cut and dried 
method, it is a scientific attitude, or as he calls it a "mor-
ale• that alone is capable of establishing and furthering demo-
cratic processes. Some of the distinctive notes of that at-
titude are: 
willingness to hold belief in suspense, 
ability to doubt until evidence is ob-
tained, willingness to go where the evi· 
dence points instead of putting first 
a personally preferred conclusion; a-
bility to hold ideas in solution to be 
tested instead of as dogmas to be as-
serted; and (possibly the most distinc-
tive of all) enjoyment of new fields 
for inquiry and of new problems.l8 
He also remarks that among scientists the number who have this 
correct attitude even toward their own work is probably very 
17 Ibid.l71. 
18 Ibid. 145. 
-
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small. 
Two of the important results 1n political affairs which 
he asserts follow from this scientific attitude are that it is 
the only guarantee against misleading propaganda and~ second• 
ly~ it is the only assurance of a public opinion intelligent 
enough to meet present social problems. In the second of 
these effects~ he is professedly offering the method of science 
as the only solution t.o the complex social problems which ap-
plied science have created or exaggerated. 
s·cience through its physical technologi-
cal consequences is now determining 
the realtions which human beings sever-
ally and in groups~ sustain to one an-
other. If it is incapable of develop-
ing moral techniques which will also de-
termine these relations, the split in 
modern culture goes so deep that not 
only democracy but all civilized values 
are doomed. Such at least is the prob-
lem~ a culture which permits science to 
destroy traditional values but which 
distrusts its power to create new ones 
is a culture which is destroying itself. 
War is a symptom as well as a cause of 
the inner division.l9 
To sum up the effect of John Dewey's theories of science 
on a philosophy of political democracy: first of all,· inven-
tion and discovery~ the basis of change~ proceed from the in-
dividual rather than the group, hence th~re must be leewa~ 
19 Ibid.l54. 
55 
for initiative if any change is to take place. Secondly, the 
scientific attitude helps to counteract propaganda and helps 
toward solving the political problems of a complex civilization. 
However, scientific advance in either the physical or social 
field is of itself indifferent to democracy, the direction in 
which it is used depends upon the intelligence taking advan-
tage of it. 
Perhaps the most important indication of the relation of 
Instrumentalism to Political democracy is to be found in Mr. 
Dewey's anal~sis of the present crisis of democracy and espe-
cially in the solution he offers for that crisis. The first 
of the problems he sees confronting democracy today is brought 
about by the abundance of physical and moral forces that have 
recently been made available to man. The difficulty is how 
to use these forces so as to prevent the subjection result-
ing from war and economic strife. The second problem is per-
haps another phase of the first, it is the basic politica 
problem ot individual freedom vs. organization. Security 
and protection demand organization, but the more efficient 
the organizations become, the greater are the sacrifices of 
freedom demanded by that efficiency. The third problem he 
poses is the prevailing dichotomy of attitude that chooses 
discussion and persuasion in politics but relies on dogma 
and authority in religious and social thinking and educa-
tional methods.20 
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The one basic solution he offers to all these problems 
is a universal renewal of faith in human nature. 21 He appeals 
to the American tradition of belief in the common man as an 
expression of belief in human nature. But in this same treat-
ment, Mr. Dewey very clearly demonstrates that he is not 
speaking of any theories based on the nature and rights of 
individuals. He prefers to speak of human nature in the large. 
and the interaction of components of human nature, since it 
is so difficult "'to locate the individual."' 
This renewal of fat th is an aim to be inculcated. It 
can only be accomplished in an environment where all the fac-
tors of culture foster the "humanistic111 outlook, where faith 
in man's ability to solve all his problema by democratic pro-
cesses: prevails. Hence the first step is to establish the 
humanistic culture. 
•e have to see that democracy means the 
belief that humanistic culture should 
prevail; we should be frank and open 
in our recognition that the proposition 
is a moral one--like ~y idea that con-
cerns what should be.22 
20 ~· 165-168. 
21 Ibid. 123-124 
22 Ibid. 124. 
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This establishment of the humanistic culture is to begin in 
the schools and include church and family. 23 
In reviewing Instrumentalism as a basis for political 
democracy, its most significant contribution would seem to be 
in the theory of progress, especially in the idea that the 
enriching and fulfillment of all the capacities of human na-
ture will be best achieved by an environment wherein all the 
divergent groups of the world's population freely interact. 
So, too, in promoting a scientific attitude, Instrumentalism 
would serve an important need in the maintenance of a healthy 
democracy; it would supplant the merely emotional standards 
of the typical v~ter with objective pragmatic criticism. 
In fact, the whole dynamic concept of Instrumentalism 
with its accent on adaptability and willingness to advance 
touches something almost essential in the democratic spirit. 
It is perhaps a necessary counterpart to the attitude of Ed-
mund Burke's ideal statesman with his disposition to preserve 
and ability to improve. This accent on advance, progress, 
and experiment is important to a contemporary democracy, where 
change of officers, continual review of policies, and a sus-
ceptibility to initiative from every segment of the public 
are supposed to prevail. 
23 Ibid. 1.29. 
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In approving that aspect of Mr. Dewey's philosophy which 
advocates the widespread inculcation of a scientific attitude 
toward government, it is on the assumption that it be a true 
scientific attitude, that is one based on the natural law, 
recognizing the dignity of the human person and the necessary 
limits of the powers of the state. This, unfortunately, is 
not,the way Mr. Dewey or his fc;>llowers interpret the phrase, 
scientific attitude. 
But the inadequacy of Instrumentalism as a. philosophical 
apologetic of the political form of democracy becomes apparent 
when the best its a~thor can offer in an earnest endeavor to 
defend democracy is a vague ":belief" in its desirability, or 
in the Instrumentalist terminology, in proposing a temporary, 
ideal aim. In speaking of the specific forms which distin-
guish political democracy, the best Mr. Dewey, as a good In-
strumentalist, can say of them is that up to the present they 
!!!! to have been discoveries of lasting value. 
The philosophy of the state which Mr. Dewey erected on 
his adverse-consequence theory is completely indifferent to 
democracy or any other form of government so long as that 
form professes to act in the public interest. It offers no 
intrinsic principle that would lead to the adoption of either 
a government by the many or the few. All that is required is 
that a scientific attitude and pragmatic approach govern the 
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decisions of the officers. The crucial test of this indif-
ference comes in the conflict between the individual and the 
group. According to the Instrumentalist philosophy of the 
state there is no indication as to the direction and no bounds 
set as to the extent of state action in such conflicts. 
Fundamentally~ the reason Mr. Dewey's effort to find a 
philosophy of democracy to supplant the doctrine of natural 
rights proved inadequate is that a process philosophy can 
justify nothing more than the process method and change. 
{Indeed by identifying danocracy with pluralism and experi-
mentalism he claims to have accomplished nothing more.) If 
all that was needed for an adequate defense of political demo-
cracy was a justification of a plastic society allowing for 
freedom of interaction and growth in the body at large 1 In-
strumentalism would suffice. But .Mr. Dewey himself has 
stressed the importance of direction, the second condition 
for progress; and without some definite knowledge of the na-
ture of the components of a society, one cannot with consis-
tency advocate the premanent vesting of direction in any de-
finite proportion of that society. Unless there is something 
sacred and of permanent value in the individual human being~ 
there can be nothing sacred or of per-manent value in a system 
safeguarding the political prerogatives of individuals. 
CHAPTER V 
PRACTICAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM 
Perhaps the most succinct statement of Mr. Dewey's dis-
agreement with the traditional basis of &merica•a constitu-
tional government is his commentary on the opening words of 
the Declaration of Independence: 
We repeat the opening words of the De-
claration of Independence but unless 
we translate them they are couched in 
a language that even when it comes 
readily to our tongue, does not pene-
trate today to the brain. •These truths 
are self-evident: that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by 
their Creator with inherent and unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, 
liberty, and. the pursuit of happiness. 
Today we are wary of anything purport-
ing to be self-evident truths; we are 
not given to associating politics with 
the plans of the Creator; the doctrine 
of natural rights which governed his 
style of expression has been weakened 
by historic and by philosophic criti-
cism.l 
But aside from the mere statement of disagreement, Mr. 
Dewey has a positive concept of law to supplant the old no-
tion of the harmony of government with the natural law and 
its consequent derived authority. He has a theory of social 
1 Freedom~ Culture, 156. 
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interaction that precludes a doctrine of individual. rights and 
throws a different light on the place of the small community 
in a democracy. 
To take up first the Instrumentalist concept of law, it 
is apparent from the adverse-consequence theory of the state--
apart from the statement just quoted--that Mr. Dewey prescinds 
from any consideration of the place of God in his political 
theory. Consequently, with the notion of the Eternal Law 
obsolete, there is no grounds for a discussion of the Natu-
ral Law. Mr. Dewey, accordingly, derives his notion of law 
from his theory of the state. 
In context, however, Mr. Dewey says there are but three 
alternative explanations of law and authority. He concludes 
that any theory asserting that will has a causal force in 
the origin of the state must necessarily devolve into a doc-
trine of superior force when the justification of the will 
which issues commands is questioned. In like manner, Rous-
seau's doctrine of an overruling general will and either the 
absolute will or absolute reason of German metaphysics are 
merely other names for superior force. The only alternative, 
he concludes is a doctrine based on widely distributed con-
sequences. 
"Rules of law are in fact the institution of conditions 
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under which persons make their arrangements with one another.•2 
The whole purpose of the law is to forecast consequences more 
accurately. When there is a uniform way of doing things, one 
oan count on the probabl~ action of his neighbors. The one 
who violates a law is merely exposing himself to the possible 
adverse consequence of being caught and punished, consequently 
the moral force of the l~w is lost. Only the penal aspect 
remains. The law is based on long-run consequences and its 
purpose is to help men overcome their shortsightedness. 
According to this interpretation, judges may make laws 
in their official capacity, if they are merely defining fur-
ther conditions of action. 3 There is here no ~estion of 
retributive justice or right and wrong. The courts have the 
' 
same function as the state in general, the preventing of ad-
verse consequences. 
In the field of criminal legislation, Dewey's theories 
would not necessarily lead to great divergence from present 
procedure. He does not hold with Lambroso that the criminal 
is entirely a victim of circumstances. Although he concedes 
a great deal to habit and environment, Mr. Dewey declares 
that the basic mistake is a failure to consider consequences, 
2 ~ Public ~ !!! ~P~r_o_b~le~m-s~, 54. 
3 Human Nature ~ Conduct, 55 footnote. 
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and public punishment is necessary to this end. Mr. Dewey 
does, however, stress the fact that the members of society 
share in the criminal's responsibility by not doing their 
part to eliminate the social environment that produces crime. 
In this regard he mentions that the concept of retributive 
justice serves as a means of dodging responsibility: "'By 
killing an evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls, 
we are enabled to forget both him and our part in creating 
him. " 4 
But in the general interpretation of law and in judicial 
procedure, Dewey's theories might have profound effects. No 
longer would the purpose of the court be restricted to a de-
termination of fact and the rendering of a decision in ac-
cordance with existing statutes. On the contrary, only the 
consequences of the present act would merit consideration. 
All l&w seems under this interpretation to be reduced to the 
status of penal laws and the notion of permanent constitutions 
or a corpus juris becomes outmoded with the idea of the growth 
and forecasting of consequences.5 
A very interesting phase of Mr. Dewey's democracy is the 
role of the functional group and the ·small community. Begin-
4 Ibid. 18. 
-
5 The Public and Its Problems, 45. 
--- --- --------
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ning on the assumption of the disintegration of the family, 
church, and neighborhood,6 he points to the void they have 
lett in social lite. In his theory, it is the intimate face-
to-face association that stimulates the deepest reaction and 
ingrains the most lasting habits of action, thought and emo-
tion. Unfortunately, the technological age has necessitated 
a wider field of organization with a consequent destruction 
of the small, local unit. But, with the general basis of 
material security the technological age is capable of estab-
lishing, a humane age can emerge.7 And the chief requisite 
for the establishment of this humane age is recourse to lo-
cal communal life: •unless local communal life can be restor-
ed, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent prob-
lem: to find and identify itself."a 
The principle, then, that would guide the growth of this 
new democracy would be that the reactions of groups bound 
together by a common interest and intimate association are 
of the greatest permanent value. 
I~ is true that ties formed by sharing 
in common work whether in what is called 
industry or what are called professions 
6 ~- 2,15. 
7 Ibid. 217. 
8 Ibid. 216. 
have nQw a force which formerly they 
did not possess. But these ties can be 
counted upon for an enduring and stable 
organization, which at the same time is 
flexible.and moving, only a~ they grow 
out of immediate intercourse and attach-
ment ••• There is no substitute for the 
vitality and depth of close and direct 
intercourse and attachment.9 
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The: political impact of this principle is evident when one 
considers that the ~public• of Mr. Dewey's theory of the state 
comas into existence and is bound together solely by its com-
mon interest, a sharing in the consequences of particular acts. 
If the community is to find itself and protect itself, it must 
know what those interests are; hence a government organized 
on the basis of common interest would came closest to solving 
the problem of the public. 
'!'here is in this principle and its application to a 
political community a strange affinity with the papal ideal 
of an organic society. Both, working from a different point 
of view, recognize the importance of the personal and inti-
mate association aa opposed to the impersonal and artificial 
social patterns imposed by the large scale centralization of 
the new industrial age. Mr. Dewey closes ~ Public and Its 
Problems with these words: -w.e lie, as Emerson said, in the 
lap of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is 
9 Ibid. 212-213. 
-
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dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and 
faint until it possesses the local community as ite medium.•lO 
Perhaps the best general summary of the social philo-
sophy of John ~ewey would be a record of the influence of the 
central thesis of Instrumentalism in his social writings. 
After studying his analysis of disparate political and cul-
tural problems, after examining the new concepts and defini-
tions he has attached to such well known words as state, the 
public, and even law, it is surprising to note the consistency 
and singleness of approach that mark his writings on all of 
these topics. All of them are seen as different manifesta-
tions of intelligence in action. 
The occasional apparent discrepancy in the works of Mr. 
Dewey, who denies the existence of any absolutes, who refuses 
even to discuss the problem of causation, yet who refers to 
ends and means, better and worse, can be resolved in the real-
ization that for him intelligence when confronted with a sin-
gle concrete problem, 1mmeadiately envisages various outcomes 
and intuitively perceives a hierarchy of desirability amongst 
these various outcomes; this operation of intelligence in 
facing a singular, concrete problem creates the temporary 
Dewey means and ends, better and worse. 
10 Ibid. 219. 
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The whole question of method and emphasis on science are 
merely rules of thumb for the exercise of intelligence in con-
crete situations. Though as a matter of historical fact, the 
laboratory method of synthesis and experimentation provided 
the inspiration for Mr. Dewey's Instrumentalism, once that 
philosophy was formulated, the various sciences became merely 
different manifestations of intelligence in action. 
The whole political philosophy outlined in !h! Public and 
Its Problems is merely one limited phase of intelligent action. 
The problems of the state are only those which imply a com-
mon interest on the part of the whole people, problems with 
adverse or beneficial results affecting them all. In fact, 
according to Mr. Dewey, a public or a state exists only as a 
result of these problems and continues in existence only so 
long as the problems remain. The official, or government, 
becomes the intelligence intrusted with the solution of these 
common problems. 
With this notion of the state as its basis and judged 
by Mr. Dewey's own standards of the good state, organization 
and efficiency, the burden of this thesis is rather easily 
proved, Instrumentalism is a less than indifferent apologetic 
for Constitutional democracy. 
Thus far we have summarized the positive impact of the 
Instrumentalist notion of intelligence on the political theory 
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of John Dewey. If all that he did was formulate a theory based 
on his concept of intelligent action, his work would be rather 
innocuous. It would mean simply that the purpose of the govern-
ment is to prevent any evil consequences that might befall the 
community as a result of joint action. The means at hand to 
prevent these consequences being the proper disposition of 
the factors involved in the problem. A proper regard for the 
nature and dignity of the human person and the whole natural 
law' might, under one interpretation be reckoned as factors 
worthy of consideration, but this is not Mr. Deweyrs inter-
pretation. 
In the first place, as was noted before, according to the 
Dewey interpretation, intelligence is not to be confused with 
the perception of the given.ll Intelligence does not perceive 
essences; it is concerned merely with consequences. Our know-
ledge of the human person is so vague that we cannot isolate 
him from his environment, much less treat of his intrinsic 
rights. This prescinding from the individual human person 
is of the very greatest moment in the consideration of demo-
cracy, for as Mr. Dewey himself admits, democracy was built 
on the theory of natural rights. 12 All that he can offer as 
11 Character ~ Events, II, 797. 
12 Freedom ~ Culture, 64. 
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a substitute is a hope that man 1s experience with democracy, 
his •taith in human nature• will lead him to preserve the 
democratic rorm of government. 
As to the practical political implications or Mr. Dewey 1s 
philosophy, law is just another arbitrary expedient made use 
of by the government to prevent adverse consequences for the 
whole community; the traditional distinction between the 
runctions of judge and legislator is dropped. As another ra-
ther vague political implication, Mr. Dewey explains the desir-
ability of an increase in the power and vitality or the lo-
cal communal group without, at the same time, mentioning how 
this is to be brought about on the present political scene. 
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